The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by an order pronounced on May 2, 2026, dismissed a civil writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by one Gopal Lal challenging the order dated December 20, 2007 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter, “JDA Tribunal”), whereby the petitioner’s appeal against the auctioning of his land by the Jaipur Development Authority (hereinafter, “JDA”) had been dismissed. The order was passed by Justice Ganesh Ram Meena.
The factual matrix of the case reveals that the petitioner claimed title over land bearing Khasra No. 128 of Revenue Village Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, measuring 0.04 hectare, asserting that it was recorded in his khatedari vide order dated November 6, 1985 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Sanganer under Section 125 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The petitioner claimed that this land was part of old Khasra No. 48/171, originally recorded in the name of one Brijmohan and later in the name of his son Roop Narayan. However, the respondent No. 1-JDA had demolished the boundary wall of the petitioner’s land and issued a newspaper advertisement dated April 6, 2007 for auctioning the land, which included the petitioner’s land, and the auction was held on April 16, 2007. The respondent No. 2 — A.M.B. Hotels Private Limited — participated as the highest bidder and its bid was accepted by the JDA vide letter dated April 23, 2007. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the JDA Tribunal, which was dismissed, and thereafter the present writ petition was filed.
The Court first examined the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, placing reliance on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329], wherein the Apex Court had held that the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot interfere with orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it merely on the drop of a hat, nor can it act as a Court of appeal over such orders. The Court noted that the power of superintendence can be exercised only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, to ensure that law is followed by exercising jurisdiction vested in them, and that interference is warranted only where there has been a patent perversity, gross and manifest failure of justice or flouting of basic principles of natural justice. The power under Article 227, the Court reiterated, cannot be exercised to correct mere errors of law or fact or simply because another view is possible, and has to be very sparingly exercised. The Court also placed reliance on the recent Supreme Court decision in Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada & Anr. [Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 8991 of 2025, decided on April 24, 2026], wherein it was held that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal and it is not open to it to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order.
On the merits, the Court examined the timeline of the land acquisition proceedings and found that the acquisition of the land-in-question had been initiated by issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 as early as August 21, 1969, followed by a declaration under Section 6 on February 28, 1973, and thereafter an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on June 3, 1981. Physical possession of 6 biswa of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer on July 6, 1982, and neither the original owner Brijmohan and his successors nor the present petitioner had ever challenged these acquisition proceedings, which had consequently become absolute, vesting the JDA with full ownership of the land. The Court found that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated November 6, 1985, on which the petitioner based his entire claim, had been passed much after the acquisition proceedings were completed and the JDA had already taken possession, and was contrary to the record and passed behind the back of the JDA. The Court held that such an order could not be made effective and enforceable against the JDA.
The Court further held that the order dated November 6, 1985 passed under Section 125 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 was also hit by Section 3 of the Rajasthan Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1976, which prohibits any person from purporting to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land in Rajasthan which has been acquired by the Government under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose. The Court held that since the land had already been acquired, the award had been passed and possession had been taken in 1982, the transfer of the land in the name of the petitioner by the order of 1985 — which was subsequent to the award and possession taken by the JDA — stood prohibited under Section 3 of the Act of 1976 and therefore did not benefit the petitioner.
The Court also noted a further infirmity in the petitioner’s claim by observing that as per the affidavit filed along with the writ petition, the petitioner’s age at the time of filing in 2008 was 37 years, which meant that in the year 1985 he was only 15 years of age and therefore a minor. The Court held that the fact of possession shown in the name of the petitioner in 1985 was wholly misconceived, observing that “a young boy of 15 years age cannot be said to be the possession over the land-in-question and the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer seems to be just fiscal proceedings of papers which has no bearing in actual.” After examining the findings of the JDA Tribunal, the Court held that they were just and proper, did not suffer from any illegality or perversity, had been arrived at after due examination of the record and application of mind, and did not call for any interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
The Court also took note of the financial prejudice suffered by the respondent No. 2 — A.M.B. Hotels Private Limited — the highest bidder in the auction, who had deposited a total of Rs. 8,20,05,000/- toward the auction, out of which Rs. 4,90,00,000/- had been refunded by the JDA on account of the pendency of litigation in the JDA Tribunal, with the remaining Rs. 3,30,05,000/- lying with the JDA. The Court noted that because of the interim status-quo order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court on March 4, 2008 when the writ petition was filed, the highest bidder had been unable to obtain possession of the auctioned land to date, and the land having been auctioned for commercial purposes, the highest bidder had certainly suffered a loss due to the prolonged pendency of the litigation.
Dismissing the writ petition as devoid of merit along with all pending applications including the stay application, the Court directed the JDA to proceed further to finalize the transfer of the land to the highest bidder. The JDA was directed to issue a fresh demand notice within fifteen days from the date of the order to the respondent No. 2 for depositing the balance amount of the bid within a reasonable period, and upon such deposit, the JDA was directed to hand over possession of the land to the respondent No. 2 without any delay and preferably within fifteen days from the date of deposit.
Case Details: Gopal Lal v. Jaipur Development Authority & Anr. | S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2127/2008 | High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur | Justice Ganesh Ram Meena | Pronounced on May 2, 2026
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