The Allahabad High Court has dismissed Writ-C No. 469 of 2026 filed by Shajiya Parveen and another, who sought directions to police authorities to restrain family members, particularly the father of petitioner no.1, from interfering in their live-in relationship and to protect their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Justice Garima Prashad, while deciding the matter in Chamber on 4th May 2026, held that in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court cannot grant protection to a live-in relationship in a manner that confers legitimacy upon or facilitates the continuation of a relationship which, in substance, operates as a substitute for a marriage that is presently impermissible under the statutory framework governing capacity to marry.
The petitioners asserted that they were residing together as a couple in a live-in relationship. Petitioner no.1 (Shajiya Parveen), a Muslim woman aged about 20 years, and petitioner no.2, a Scheduled Caste Hindu male aged about 19 years, claimed that the father of petitioner no.1 was threatening them to sever their relationship, though the parents of petitioner no.2 had no objection. They submitted that they could not solemnize marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 as petitioner no.2 had not attained 21 years of age. Reliance was placed on previous orders of the Court granting protection to live-in couples, contending that as majors they have the right to live with a person of their choice with or without marriage.
The Additional Chief Standing Counsel opposed the petition, relying on the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. It was contended that petitioner no.2, being below 21 years, falls within the definition of “child” and lacks legal capacity to enter into marriage, and the Court ought not to indirectly permit a marriage-like relationship under the garb of live-in arrangement, as it would defeat legislative intent.
The Court extensively examined the legislative scheme, noting that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 defines a “child” as a male who has not completed 21 years and a female who has not completed 18 years. It described the 2006 Act as a complete code for prevention and intervention, providing for voidability of child marriages, punishments, injunctions, and appointment of Child Marriage Prohibition Officers. Similar age requirements were noted under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 5(iii)) and Special Marriage Act, 1954 (Section 4(c)), with penal and nullity consequences. The Court held that a uniform legislative policy treats a male below 21 years as lacking requisite legal capacity for marital relationship.
Justice Garima Prashad observed that a live-in relationship involving cohabitation, intimacy, and mutual dependency is, in practical substance, a relationship in the nature of marriage. When consciously adopted as an alternative because marriage is statutorily barred, court protection would amount to indirect sanction of an impermissible marriage-like arrangement, violating the doctrine that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Court further noted that permitting such a relationship could expose the woman to insecurity, as the male child retains the option to avoid the union later under Section 3 of the 2006 Act. On parity with POCSO Act principles applicable to girls below 18, consent cannot bypass statutory restrictions for a male child below 21.
While parents cannot resort to threats, violence, or illegal acts, they cannot be restrained from taking lawful steps under the 2006 Act, such as approaching authorities or seeking injunctions. The Court distinguished precedents like Nandakumar, Lata Singh, and Shafin Jahan, noting they dealt with legally competent adults and do not permit bypassing statutory age thresholds. The petition was dismissed as it contained only vague and omnibus allegations without specific incidents of threat or coercion. The petitioners were however left at liberty to approach police with specific complaints for protection against unlawful acts, in terms of relevant Government Orders, without restraining lawful parental or statutory actions.
The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.
Case Title: Shajiya Parveen and another v. State of U.P. and 3 others
Case No.: Writ-C No. 469 of 2026
Coram: Justice Garima Prashad
Date of Judgment: 4th May, 2026
Click HERE for full Judgment.
Lawcutor 