The Supreme Court of India, in two connected criminal appeals, delivered a ruling on April 24, 2026, setting aside the bail orders granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to two accused persons — Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora and Gurjit Singh @ Geetu — both charged for offences punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter, “the NDPS Act”). The Bench comprised Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, with the order authored by Justice Augustine George Masih.
The facts giving rise to the appeals trace back to January 10, 2024, when, during a vehicle check at a police barricade on Canal Road near Village Veeram in District Tarn Taran, Punjab, a Mahindra XUV-300 car bearing registration No. UP-15-DD-6521 was intercepted by police. Upon search, three packets of heroin were recovered — two packets weighing 957 grams from Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora and one packet weighing 508 grams from Gurjit Singh @ Geetu, aggregating to a total of 1.465 kilograms of heroin — an amount admittedly constituting “commercial quantity” under the NDPS Act. A chargesheet was filed on June 21, 2024, and charges were formally framed by the Trial Court on July 20, 2024, under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
Both accused persons, after having their first bail applications either dismissed or withdrawn, filed successive petitions before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The High Court, by its order dated February 18, 2026, enlarged both accused on regular bail primarily recording that they had remained in custody for over two years; that only 2 out of 24 prosecution witnesses had been examined despite charges being framed in July 2024; that the trial was likely to take considerable time; and that continued incarceration would be violative of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Most critically, the High Court recorded in the impugned order that “the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.”
The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the mandatory requirements under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, which governs the grant of bail in cases involving commercial quantity of contraband. The Court reaffirmed that where recovery of commercial quantity is involved and the Public Prosecutor opposes bail, the Court is mandatorily required to record its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions before granting bail — first, that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court held that “the recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a mandatory pre-condition, the non-observance of which vitiates the grant of bail.” Placing reliance on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif [(2024) 11 SCC 372], State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another [(2024) 15 SCC 36], and Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh [2023 SCC OnLine SC 346], the Court reiterated that the recording of twin satisfaction under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained.
On the interplay between Article 21 of the Constitution and Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court held that “the right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it.” The Court further held that “the constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other.” The Court found that the High Court’s observation that the rigors of Section 37 can be diluted on account of the right to speedy trial was “plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.”
Beyond the core legal infirmity, the Supreme Court also noted serious factual errors in the impugned order in the case of Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora. The High Court had recorded that the respondent was “not involved in any other case” and expressly counted this as a factor weighing in favour of the grant of bail. However, the Court noted that in paragraph 12 of the very bail petition preferred before the High Court, the respondent himself had admitted that “apart from the present case one more case FIR is there against him.” The Court held that “the recording of the High Court and the admission by the respondent are irreconcilable” and that “a Court while considering the prayer for bail under a special statute and attracting Section 37 of the NDPS Act could not have granted relief on grounds directly at odds with the admissions made by the respondent in the very petition before it.”
The Supreme Court further noted that the impugned order was conspicuously silent on the fact that the bail petition before the High Court was the second successive petition under Section 483 of the BNSS — the first petition having been dismissed or withdrawn only months earlier. The Court held that “a Court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and to record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration,” and that the impugned order’s silence on this aspect was a serious omission, especially given the short time gap between the dismissal of the earlier application and the filing of the subsequent one.
The Supreme Court also addressed the manner in which both accused had disclosed their earlier bail petitions before the High Court. In both cases, the disclosure in the bail petitions was limited to bare case numbers, without disclosing the nature of the earlier proceedings or their outcome. The Court held that “a disclosure so worded, in a matter where the Court is called upon to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, falls well short of the candour that an applicant seeking the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction is bound to observe.” The Court further stated that “it is a settled principle that he who invokes the discretion of the Court must approach it with clean hands and place the full picture before it. A disclosure that is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate cannot, in the eye of the law, be regarded as a disclosure at all.”
The Supreme Court also placed reliance on Parwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Criminal Appeal No. 3931 of 2023], wherein this Court had cautioned that having regard to the drug menace afflicting the State of Punjab, Courts ought to be highly circumspect while granting bail in NDPS cases. The Court noted that in the case of Gurjit Singh @ Geetu, the respondent was already enlarged on bail in another case at the time the High Court considered his bail application — a material circumstance that the High Court had not adequately addressed in the impugned order.
Allowing both appeals filed by the State of Punjab, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders dated February 18, 2026 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No. 70945 of 2025 and CRM-M No. 72303 of 2025 respectively. Both respondents were directed to surrender before the Trial Court within one week from the date of the order. Liberty was expressly reserved to both respondents to apply afresh for regular bail before the competent Court upon surrender, with all contentions going to the merits of the prosecution case left open for consideration at that stage.
State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora & State of Punjab v. Gurjit Singh @ Geetu | 2026 INSC 411
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